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CASE NOTES

intoxication and death in the proximate cause-and-effect relationship nec24
essary to recovery.
This case has enunciated no new theories or rules to be applied to Dramshops Act cases in the future. It has, however, demonstrated something
more valuable. A complicated problem stemming from a unique set of
facts has been resolved upon the basic principles of cause and effect. In
other words, the case of Kirulik v. Cohn is an indication of the logical extreme to which the interpretation of the phrase "in consequence of" can
be drawn.
24 Instruction given to the jury as to the meaning of the term "proximate cause" directed them to look for "that cause which, in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any other cause, produced the event. The consequences must be natural

and probable consequences as distinguished from a possible consequence." Abstract of
record, instruction 13 at 340.

EQUITY-LACK OF MUTUALITY OF REMEDY AT INCEPTION OF CONTRACT HELD NO DEFENSE IN
ACTION FOR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
Manilow was a purchaser of real estate. His agent, Gould, sued the
record title holders, the true beneficial owners, and their broker, for specific performance on a contract for the purchase of land. Manilow executed to Gould a general power of attorney in 1948, and on numerous
occasions since then, Gould had entered into contracts for the purchases
of real property, executing the instruments in her own name but on behalf
of Manilow. In 1953, the beneficial owners authorized and directed their
broker to put the property in question up for sale. The broker and Manilow negotiated the terms of a contract for the purchase of this land. The
broker then obtained the signature of the record title holders and submitted the contract to Manilow who orally instructed Gould to sign her
name on his behalf. On many occasions since the contract has been signed,
Manilow repeated his affirmation of the contract, including the act of
filing suit in this case.
Defendants moved to dismiss upon the ground that the power of attorney authorized Gould to contract in the name of Manilow and on his behalf, and not in her own name. They argued that Manilow was not bound
by the contract because there was an absence of mutuality of remedy at
the inception which precludes recovery. The trial court sustained the motion to dismiss and Gould appealed directly to the Illinois Supreme Court
since a freehold was involved. The supreme court held that lack of
mutuality of remedy at the inception of a contract is no longer a defense
to a suit for specific performance. Gould v. Stelter, 14 Ill. 2d 376, 152
N.E. 2d 869 (1958).
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The question before the supreme court was: To what extent does the
doctrine of mutuality of remedy in specific performance cases survive
today?'
There were, until the decision in the instant case, two conflicting lines of
authority in Illinois as to whether mutuality of remedy is necessary at the
inception of the contract. The defendants relied on the line of authorities
which followed Gage v. Cummings,2 wherein the court, in accordance
with Lord Justice Fry stated:
A contract to be specifically enforced by the court must be mutual, that is to
say, such that it might, at the time it was entered into have been enforced by
either of the parties against the other of them. Whenever, therefore, whether
from personal incapacity, the nature of the contract, or any other cause, the
contract is incapable of being enforced against one party, that party is equally
incapable of enforcing it against the other, though its execution in the latter
way might
in itself be free from the difficulty attending its execution in the
3
former.
The defendants further relied on Wloczewski v. Kozlowski 4 which also
held that specific performance for the sale of land will not be granted unless the contract is mutually enforceable and binding on both parties at the
point of execution. This rule had also been stated previously in Ulrey v.

Keith5 and Barker v. Hauberg.6
The other line of reasoning included the case of Ulisperger v. Meyer.7
The court in this case, while it was clearly an exception to the Gage case,
held:
Want of mutuality arising from the failure of both parties to sign cannot be
successfully pleaded as a defense by the party who did sign, as the act of filing
a bill for specific performance binds the plaintiff and renders the contract
mutual.8
Not only did the Meyer case prove to be an exception to the Gage case
but there has been a multiplicity of instances in which specific performance has been allowed, although the remedy was not available to both
parties when the contract was executed. 9 These cases have, in effect,
1 The court held it was unnecessary to determine whether the power of attorney
from Manilow authorized Gould to sign the contract in her own name, and at once

turned to the contention that specific performance will not lie unless that remedy was
available to both parties at the time the contract was executed.
2 209 I11.120, 70 N.E. 679 (1904).
3

Ibid., at 121 and 680. Consult Fry on Specific Performance, § 286.

4 395 I11.402, 70 N.E. 2d 560 (1946).

5 237 I11.284, 86 N.E. 696 (1908).
7 217 Ill. 262, 75 N.E. 482 (1905).
6 325 111. 538, 156 N.E. 806 (1927).
8 Ibid., at 264 and 484.
9 Laegler v. Bartlett, 10 I11.2d 478, 140 N.E. 2d 702 (1957); Espadron v. Davis, 385 I11.
304, 52 N.E. 2d 716 (1944); Lewis v. McCreedy, 378 I11.264, 38 N.E. 2d 170 (1941);
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allowed specific performance because mutuality of remedy had arisen by
virtue of subsequent acts.
The doctrine of mutuality of remedy at the inception has been rejected
in almost all jurisdictions, 10 and has also drawn much criticism from legal
scholars." The doctrine has been entirely rejected by the Restatement of
Contracts, Section 373.
The Illinois court has now, by its decision in the Gould case, overruled
the Gage and Wloczewski cases insofar as they were based upon a supposed want of mutuality at the inception. The court has adopted the
rules and reasons set down by Justice Cardozo in Epstein v. Gluckin.12 In
an action for specific performance the court stated the true situation:
In such an exercise of jurisdiction, there is no risk of hardship or injustice to
the vendor. The assignee, by the very act of invoking the aid of equity, assumes the duty of performance, and subjects himself to any conditions of the
judgment appropriate, thereto ....
At first the vendor had the obligation of
the vendee, and of no one else. The obligation thus imposed has not been lost,
but another has been added. Someone has at all times been charged with the
duty of performance. The continuity of remedy is unbroken from contract to
decree.
What equity exacts today as a condition of relief is the assurance that the
decree, if rendered, will operate without injustice or oppression either to
plaintiff or defendant ....
Mutuality of remedy is important in so far only as
its presence is essential to the attainment of that end.' 3
The law in Illinois is that so long as there is justice done between the
parties, mutuality of remedy is important only insofar as its presence is
essential to the attainment of this end. Therefore it matters not when
mutuality arose, so long as it exists. 14
The impact of no longer needing mutuality of remedy at the inception
of a contract has been widespread in that a majority of states now follow
the rule of Justice Cardozo in the Epstein case.
In accordance with the concurring opinion in the Gould case, it may be
argued that it was unnecessary for the purposes of the Gould case, for
Estes v. Furlong, 59 Ill. 298 (1871). Consult: Kovacs v. Krol, 385 111.
593, 53 N.E. 2d 456
(1944), a contract contingent upon the purchaser's ability to secure a loan may be specifically enforced.
10 Van Zandt v. Heilman, 54 N.M. 97, 214 P. 2d 864 (1950); Zelleken v. Lynch, 80 Kan.
746, 104 Pac. 563 (1909); Epstein v. Gluckin, 233 N.Y. 490, 135 N.E. 861 (1922).
11 Ames, Mutuality in Specific Performance, 3 Colum.L.Rev. 104 (1903); Cook, The
Present Status of the Lack of Mutuality Rule, 36 Yale L. J. 897 (1927); 1 Harv. L. Rev.
104 (1887); Simpson, 50 Years of American Equity, 50 Harv. L. Rev. 171 (1936); Williston on Contracts, S 1433 (1938).
12233 N.Y. 490, 135 N.E. 861 (1922).

Is Ibid., at 862.
14 Gould v. Stetler, 14 IMl.2d 376, 152 N.E. 2d 869 (1958).
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that court to have overruled the doctrine as laid down in the Gage and
Wloczewski cases. However, there is no doubt that the Gould case did
clarify and settle the law that equity does not require mutuality of remedy
to exist at the inception of a contract, but that such mutuality may also
occur by the commission of subsequent acts.

FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT-MUNICIPALITY NOT ALLOWED TO USE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AS DEFENSE
AGAINST FEDERAL GOVERNMENT COUNTERCLAIM
On April 13, 1958, a City of Newark ambulance collided with a United
States mail truck. The city brought an action against the United States in
the District Court under the Federal Tort Claims Act in the amount of
$3,000.1 The United States asserted a counterclaim for damage to the mail
truck totaling $245.75. The court found the concurrent negligence of
both drivers to be the cause of the accident. Judgment on the counterclaim
was entered for the municipality on the grounds that the defendant was
prevented from raising a defense of contributory negligence by New
Jersey decisions as applied under the Federal Tort Claims Act. Recovery
was denied to the city because the negligent act of the ambulance operator
was an "active wrongdoing" and, as such, was imputable to the municipality under New Jersey case law. Upon appeal by the plaintiff, the United
States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, affirmed the decision, but held
that the United States was not precluded from asserting a defense of contributory negligence. City of Newark v. United States, 254 F. 2d 93
(C.A. 3d, 1958).
This case raises the unusual point of whether the Federal Tort Claims
Act should be read literally, when such an interpretation results not only
in waiver of the sovereign immunity of the United States, but also in the
enhancement of the position of the municipal corporation by depriving
the federal government of a defense which it had prior to the passage of
the Act.
The immunity of the United States to actions commenced without its
express consent is traceable to the English political concept that the King
can do no wrong. While this political concept was repudiated in this
country, the legal doctrine, that the Crown was nevertheless immune from
suits to which it did not consent, has been consistently and vigorously
applied to the federal government. 2 Prior to the Federal Tort Claims Act,
relief against the federal government for legal wrongs committed by its
160 Stat. 846 (1946), 28 U.S.C. S 1346 (b) (c) (1948).
2 U.S. Const. Art. III, § 2, cl.1; Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950); Kansas v.

United States, 204 U.S. 331 (1907); United States v. McLemore, 45 U.S. 286 (1846).

